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V. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Richard A. Epstein*
INTRODUCTION
It is always tempting in looking at Supreme Court cases to think
of them narrowly, chiefly in light of the fact patterns that they
examine. But that minimalist approach is intellectually risky
because it runs the risk of focusing on one discrete part of legal
doctrine in isolation from the larger whole of which it is a part.'
What is often missing is a keen awareness of the need to integrate
cases with one another in service of a general theory that is faithful
to both the text and structure of the Constitution. In this instance,
* Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, The New York University School of Law, the
Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, The James Parker
Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law Emeritus and Senior Lecturer, The
University of Chicago Law School. This paper is a much-expanded version of the
remarks that I gave at the Conference on Horne, organized by the New York
University Journal of Law and Liberty and the Classical Liberal Institute at NYU on
February 26, 2016. Much thanks to members of the University of Chicago Work-in-
Progress workshop on June 9, 2016 for their trenchant criticisms of an earlier draft of
the paper. My thanks to Jack Millman and Max Raskin, NYU Law School Class of
2016, and Philip Cooper, University of Chicago, Class of 2017, and John Tienken,
University of Chicago, Class of 2018 for their valuable research assistance.
1 For an example of that approach, see Stephen S. Schwartz, Horne v. USDA: An
Exercise in Minimalism?, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 777 (2016).
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the Takings Clause is at issue. The Clause states: " [Nior shall
private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." 2 The facts of any particular case should serve as a
springboard to discuss the full range of relevant doctrinal issues.
That analysis works well when the precedents are in good order.
The new case need only be fitted into the preexisting framework.
But the process is quite different whenever the existing pattern of
case law is in a sad state of disarray. Now each new piece to the
puzzle only reveals the gaps, overlaps, and inconsistencies in the
existing construct. At this point a total reexamination is typically in
order.
It is widely agreed that takings law is something of a muddle.3
But there is far less agreement on what to do in order to set it right.
There are those who think that because the effort to create islands of
per se takings in a sea of rational basis law is doomed to failure, the
government should therefore be given broad sway over all matters
of economic regulation, taxation, and control. On that view, even
the modest effort to defend the per se takings rule - which in any
event is overstated -for permanent physical takings is a mistake, 4
and the entire area should be governed by the three part takings
test developed in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.
Yet it is equally possible - in my view necessary - to insist on
coherence but run it in the opposite direction, so that all regulatory
takings are treated under the more rigorous framework on the same
basis as physical takings. What that means in this context is that the
rational basis test is out. What it does not mean is that all
regulations of property and contract are per se unconstitutional.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S.
CAL. L. REv. 561 (1984).
4 See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 22
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2014).
5 438 U. S. 104 (1978).
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Instead, the government can win if it either has some strong police
power justification for limiting or shutting down private activity or
by showing that the comprehensive scheme in question affords
compensation, typically in-kind, for the parties whose right to use
or dispose of property is limited in some substantial way. 6 Both of
these points of analysis eliminate the middle ground by showing
the huge chasm between progressive and classical liberal theory on
the desirability of strong (but not absolute) property rights.
Unfortunately, Chief Justice John Roberts, who wrote the
majority opinion in Horne v. Department of Agriculture,7 did not use
the occasion to rethink the law. Instead, a born litigator, he followed
his deep incrementalist instincts by trying to displace as little of the
furniture of takings law as possible while requiring the government
to pay compensation for the raisins that it hauled off at the crack of
dawn from the Hornes. Ultimately, his effort to rationalize the
outcome of Horne II within the existing case law falls apart, but in
instructive ways that reveal the deep internal fissures within
current takings law. It is also instructive to note that the two other
opinions in the case, written by Justice Breyer and Justice
Sotomayor, only add further layers of complexity to the case. The
overriding conclusion to be drawn from these marginal adjustments
to the tangled field of takings doctrine is that more than mid-course
corrections are needed to put this area of law on an even keel. Yet
there are important doctrinal threads in Horne, which, if exploited
and developed, could lead to the long overdue fundamental
rethinking of this troubled area.
6 See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (discussing legitimate applications of the police power and
the ability of in-kind compensation to satisfy the Takings Clause).
7135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015) (hereinafter Home II). The Supreme Court delivered two
opinions in this case. The first, Home v. U.S. Dep't ofAgriculture, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013)
(hereinafter Home I) addressed procedural questions. Home II reached the actual
takings issue. This article refers to the collective cases as Home.
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Part I of this article addresses the background situation of the
Horne cases. The remaining parts then explore in sequence the
particular questions that were canvassed in Horne I. Part II
addresses the role of the distinction between real and personal
property in takings law. Part III then turns to the prima facie case of
a taking. Part IV briefly assesses the issue of public use in takings
cases. Part V then looks at the issue of just compensation,
considering the role of both explicit and implicit-in-kind
compensation in takings cases. Part VI examines the troubled
distinction between physical and regulatory takings with special
reference to the landlord-tenant context. Part VII looks at the
peculiar role that a reserved contingent interest plays both in Horne
II and in rent control and stabilization cases. Part VIII considers the
role of unconstitutional conditions in Horne II and real estate
takings cases. Part IX generalizes the argument and defends the
case for using a unified theory for covering all takings, regulations
and taxes by a unified theory as the only way to eliminate textual
confusion and institutional jumble that comes out of modern
takings law. A short conclusion follows.
I. BACKGROUND
The Horne litigation is unusual in that it involved two separate
trips to the Supreme Court, each of which resulted in a defeat for
the government.8 The underlying transaction took place under the
mysterious confines of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
("AMAA") of 1937, passed at the height of the New Deal. The
explicit justification for the AMAA was commonplace at the time:
the glut of agricultural products coming onto the market meant that
government had a useful role to play in what was euphemistically
8 See supra note 7. For a more detailed account, see Michael W. McConnell, The Raisin
Case, CATO Sup. CT. REv. 313 (2015).
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called the "stabilization" of commodity prices.9 Markets, of course,
are able to stabilize prices through the interplay of supply and
demand. When quantities get high, then prices go down. If they
sink too low, then some of the least efficient producers exit the
market until prices rise to their appropriate level, i.e., where all of
the remaining producers are able to make money. As the market
stabilizes, other farmers and producers redeploy their resources to
their next best use. In the short run, they could shift to other crops.
In the long run, they could exit the industry entirely.
These market adjustments do bring about serious individual
dislocations, but it is a mistake to assume that such dislocations take
place only if the government stoutly refuses to intervene. Indeed,
once the government does intervene a new and more durable set of
distortions are put into place, as funds from somewhere else, raised
by tax dollars, must be found to prop up prices for all existing
producers by eliminating substantial fractions of the overall output.
The artificially higher prices translate into reduced consumer
welfare, which is important in any overall social calculation of the
strengths and weaknesses of the existing practices. In the long run,
it becomes impossible to eliminate the excess supply, so that an exit
of some firms from the industry, and an expansion of others, takes
place. The high concentration of small growers in the 1930s is not an
accurate reflection of the market today given the rise of modern
agribusiness. 10 But those legal rules stubbornly persist.
The New Deal framework flatly precludes this form of market
stabilization in the context of the raisin market. Instead, its view of
9 See Daniel Bensing, The Promulgation and Implementation of Federal Marketing Orders
Regulating Fruit and Vegetable Crops under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of
1937, 5 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIc. L. REV. 3, 5-6 (1995).
10 Karen Bradshaw, Using Takings to Undo Givings, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 649, 650
(2016) ("Since passage of early Farm Bill Legislation in the 1930's, the industrial
economics of agriculture have changed profoundly. Agribusiness has shifted from
millions of small farmers to a smaller number of growers, and sometimes
consolidated oligopolies.").
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stabilization aims for high prices that necessitate the removal of
raisins from the supply distribution network. In Horne, the needed
reductions in outputs necessary to reach the target price were
imposed under a 1949 California Raisin Market Order that
established a "Raisin Administrative Committee" (RAC). 11 That
body was dominated by the 35 producer representatives and
augmented by ten representatives of the handlers, i.e., typically
processors and distributors, but not growers. 12 Two additional
representatives, one for the cooperative associations and one lonely
voice for the public, completed the roster. 13 By design, the RAC
stacked the deck in favor of the growers on the dubious New Deal
view that only industry members had the knowledge and
incentives to set the right prices for a long-term sustainable market
without risk of exit.
To work its magic, the RAC routinely assembles the data and
generates a recommendation for the amount of reserve tonnage
needed to sustain the higher prices. 14 These cuts are then duly
allocated down to the individual farm. These were not small
adjustments. They equaled 47 percent of output for 2002-2003, and
30 percent of output for 2003-2004. 15 Consistent with the
overarching plan, these raisins may be sold overseas or distributed
without cost to local noncompetitive markets, such as with school
lunches. 16 Both of these options were designed to deal with
surpluses without lowering market prices. In the event that the
RAC accounts contained some surplus cash at the end of the year,
these funds were returned pro rata to the growers.1 7
11 Home I, 133 S. Ct. at 2057.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Home II, 135 S. Ct. at 2424.
16 Id.
17 Id.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty
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The Hornes objected in principle to the program. They claimed
that they were entitled to sell all the raisins that they produced as
free tonnage. 18 The Hornes engaged in a nifty self-dealing
transaction in order to pretend that they were not handlers, and
thus not subject to the restraints of the AMAA.1 9 But once that
facade was punctured, the central issue in the case was joined. The
government came one day to collect the reserve raisins at 8:00 AM,
only to be sent back empty-handed by the Hornes.20 At this point,
the government shifted gears and obtained an administrative
determination that the Hornes were subject to civil penalties in the
amount of $202,600 and $483,843.53 for the two years, equal to the
fair market value of the raisins that they were unwilling to turn
over as reserve tonnage plus a civil penalty for disobedience. 21
In the initial proceeding, the government took the position that
it could impose the fine without allowing the grower to inject his
taking defense in the same action.22 To use the language of contract,
the government treated the two claims as independent, so that the
government collection of the fine could go forward, forcing the
Hornes to mount a separate action in the Federal Court of Claims to
vindicate their takings claim. In Horne I, Justice Thomas rejected this
argument on unassailable grounds. There is no need to bifurcate
this litigation when all the elements needed to raise the defense are
present on the record of the initial case.23 The situation is a direct
parallel to the law of conditions in the law of contract, where the
accepted view is that two covenants that are given to each other as
quid pro quos are dependent. A breach of one, therefore, provides a
defense against any suit brought for the breach of the other. The
1s Id.
19 Home I, 133 S. Ct. at 2058.
2 0 Home II, 135 S. Ct. at 2424.
21 Id. at 2425.
2 This claim was vindicated in the court below. See Horne v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 673
F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2012).
23 Home 1, 133 S. Ct. at 2063-64.
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paradigm case for these purposes was Kingston v. Preston,24 Which
held that a seller who agrees to part with a business in a credit sale
need not transfer the business over if the potential buyer has not
come up with the security stipulated in the agreement. Clearly the
ex ante efficiency of the arrangement precludes forcing the seller to
bear this huge uncompensated credit risk. Simultaneity in the
performance of these two interdependent promises is the norm.
The same logic applies in Horne I. To be sure, there was no risk
that the government could not pay the takings claim if required to
do so in the Federal Court of Claims. But there was an enormous
risk of added expense, delay, and procedural entanglements from
forcing the Hornes to bring a second lawsuit when all the relevant
issues could be resolved at once. The federal rules normally
encourage the resolution of defenses - there was no counterclaim in
this case -as part of the original suit.25 It was rather sad that the
government took the opposite position, and even sadder that the
Ninth Circuit embraced it.26 The government's view that the claim
was not yet ripe for adjudication was fanciful at best. There was no
fact that was not known at the time that the government sought
damages and civil penalties.
The trial of the case in Horne II took place on admitted facts, so
the only question for the Supreme Court was whether the
transaction as a whole should be regarded as a compensable taking.
That inquiry, in turn, generates the specific questions identified
above.
24 2 Doug. 689, 99 Eng. Rep. 437 (K.B. 1773).
25 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (establishing the rule for compulsory counterclaims).
26 Horne v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014).
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR REAL AND
PERSONAL PROPERTY
In one sense the dispute in Horne II was set up by the highly
improbable claim of the Ninth Circuit that "the Takings Clause
affords less protection to personal than to real property," 27 which in
practice would have left it only the protection of the vague
balancing tests under Penn Central where property owners almost
invariably lose.28 The Chief Justice rejected the point by reciting the
basic holding of Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.: "We
conclude that a permanent physical occupation authorized by
government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it
may serve." 29
At this point, note the two deep weaknesses in this canonical
formulation. This so-called per se rule cannot be a rule that
invariably applies to all cases, for otherwise, when the government
takes property to foreclose on a tax lien, it has to remit the fair
market value of the property to the party on whose property the
lien was attached. This manufactured requirement to compensate
for the value of the seized item obviously defeats the purposes of
the lien. It is important, therefore, that the per se taking rule be
jettisoned, as it is not accurate to claim that every seizure of
property by the government demands compensation. However, I
think it is also incorrect to follow Professor McConnell's suggestion
that the term "actual taking" eliminates the conceptual problem. 30
The use of that term does not give any signal that physical takings
may sometimes be justifiable without need for compensation. Nor
does it explain why regulatory takings are not actual takings, albeit
takings of a partial interest in land, namely a restrictive covenant
27 Id. at 1140.
2 See e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (utilizing a
multi-factor balance test to determine that a taking had not occurred).
29 458 U.S. 419,426 (1982).
30 McConnell, supra note 8, at 314.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty
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for the benefit of either the immediate neighbors or the public at
large.3 1 It may well be, and indeed is the case, that the range of
possible justifications for regulatory takings is broader than those
available for occupations: it is permissible to shut down a nuisance,
but not necessarily to take the land on which it occurs. And, so too,
the probability of implicit in-kind compensation is far broader in
regulatory contexts than in physical occupation cases.32
The confusion only gets deeper because there is no explanation
as to why the physical taking has to be permanent in order to be
compensable. This point is of serious relevance in Home because
some of the money collected from the resale of raisins by the
government was placed in a fund from which payments back to
plan participants could be made at the end of the year.33 So the
transaction is not a complete, outright taking. The correct way to
take this bauble into account is to reduce the amount of the
compensation owing at the outset by the expected value of the
return payment, or, in the alternative, by letting the government
keep that return payment by paying full value for the raisins in
advance.
By deviating from the simple rule - the more you take the more
you pay- Loretto introduces yet a second mistake in the takings
law, which can rear its ugly head in a complex institutional setting.
It is not surprising that in Horne II the Chief Justice dutifully goes
back to the Magna Carta to find texts that indicate that the taking of
corn or carts from private parties generates a duty of compensation,
which is surely correct.M But in these traditional cases, the issue of
return in-kind benefit from the government action cannot arise. It
31 See Richard A. Epstein, Physical and Regulatory Takings: One Distinction Too Many,
64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 99 (2012), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online
/physical-regulatory-takings.
32 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 195-15.
3 Home 1, 133 S. Ct. at 2058.
3 Home II, 135 S. Ct. at 2426.
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has long been decided that the general benefit that each person gets
solely from the government's use of his private assets, a benefit
equally felt by both the taking victim and all other citizens, is not
compensation for what is taken. If all such equal and diffuse
benefits counted as compensation, the constitutional just
compensation test would be satisfied in a pro forma fashion
whenever all members of the public derived some general benefit
from the government's disposition of the taken property. Precedent
after precedent indicates that the government must pay
compensation when, for example, it requisitions private property
for military purposes when ordinary markets are not available to
complete the purchase.35 And it is surely the case that the right to
exclude the use of one's property by others that is granted by
patents is covered by the Takings Clause, even though the
government is under no obligation to create a patent system or
issue any particular patent in the first place.36 In the same vein, it is
established that trade secrets - created in all cases by private
behavior only -are also a form of private property that has
constitutional protection.37 The first leg of Horne I's journey through
the history of takings law is thus completed with some unnecessary
historical diversions wrought by the decision in the Ninth Circuit.
The pesky little reversionary interest in the leftover proceeds is
dismissed as a "speculative hope that some residual proceeds" may
be paid back.38 But in this regard, the Chief Justice equivocates on
the term "hope." He makes it appear as though the reversionary
interest is just an expectation that is not enforceable, much like the
heir who expects to receive property from an ancestor but lacks the
legal ability to prevent the ancestor from leaving it to someone else.
3 See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. 623 (1871).
3 James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882).
37 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001-02 (1984) (holding that trade
secrets are assignable, and may constitute the corpus of a trust).
38 Home 1, 135 S. Ct. at 2428.
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But in Horne II, the so-called "hope" is actually an enforceable legal
right to receive that money should it become owing. It is much the
same as the wife who has the right to her dower interest, even
though it is contingent on her surviving her husband. By excluding
this enforceable reversionary interest from the takings calculus, the
Chief Justice thus makes his case easier than it should be.
III. TAKINGS: THE PRIMA FACIE CASE
Once it is agreed that full-fledged property is involved, the
next question is whether it was taken. If not, the case ends. If the
property was taken, then the question is whether there exists, in the
language of pleading, an affirmative defense. Establishing a prima
facie takings case in Horne raises one small complication: did the
government take the grapes? In a sense, the answer is no, because
the government only fined the Hornes for their failure to turn over
these raisins. But clearly the government could only impose that
fine if the Hornes had done something wrong in refusing to turn
over the raisins without compensation; otherwise every
constitutional prohibition could be circumvented by first
announcing the imposition of a fine on a constitutionally protected
behavior, and then collecting that fine to assure compliance. So the
government fine counts as a taking, absent an underlying
justification for taking the raisins in the first place. This is the issue
that the Hornes wanted to tee up.
With the prima facie case established, what of the defenses?
Here, the typical police power defenses are not relevant because
there is no issue of health and safety. After all, these raisins were
indistinguishable from those free raisins that the government
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty
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allowed to go to market.39 Hence, the only remaining questions deal
with pubic use and just compensation. I take these up in order.
IV. PUBLIC USE
At this point the case turns on defenses. What should the
Hornes be able to say in their defense? The initial query is whether
they should be entitled to shut down the raisin program on the
ground that it intends to benefit only a small fraction of the
population at the expense of the public at large, and thus cannot
qualify as a taking for public use, even under the expansive
doctrine of Kelo v. City of New London.40 Recall that Justice Stevens's
opinion in Kelo required that a taking for public use have at least
some public deliberation as to how a proposed land use program
advanced the public good.41 Justice Thomas thus draws blood when
he writes in Horne II: "It is far from clear that the Raisin
Administrative Committee's conduct meets that [Kelo] standard. It
takes the raisins of citizens and, among other things, gives them
away or sells them to exporters, foreign importers, and foreign
governments."42
V. JUST COMPENSATION
The just compensation question raises far greater complications.
The initial point is that no cash compensation is provided, so
everything turns on whether the government has provided implicit
in-kind compensation for the raisins taken. The Chief Justice tried to
finagle the question by pointing to the shenanigans in Horne I
without addressing the return-benefit question on which the entire
3 The standard police power quartet was "health, morals, safety, and [the] general
welfare of the community." Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,
392 (1926).
40 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
41 Id. at 484.
42 Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2433 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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case hinges. His sleight of hand has the practical consequences of
eliminating the reserve program, without giving the government a
clean shot at defending its position on the offsetting benefit issue.
One telltale sign on this point is that the regulations in question
were by the farmers and for the farmers, so that in the aggregate it
is highly unlikely that their economic effect cuts against the farmers
as a class. Hence, as Justice Breyer argues in his partial dissent, the
compensation came from the increased value of the retained grapes,
all of which was attributed to the artificial scarcity created by the
marketing orders.43 Justice Breyer thus rightly relied on Bauman v.
Ross44 for the proposition that the direct benefits from the scheme
should be allowed to offset the economic burdens imposed by the
law.45 As discussed in the earlier case of Monongahela v. United
States,46 it is of course a wholly different proposition to say that a
person whose property is devoted to public use, without any
special return benefit, should have his compensation reduced
because he, like other members of society, gains from the public
taking.47
43 Id. at 2433-34 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
-4 167 U.S. 548 (1897).
45 Id. at 581-582:
We, of course, exclude the indirect and general benefits which result to the
public as a whole, and therefore to the individual as one of the public; for
he pays in taxation for his share of such general benefits. But if the
proposed road or other improvement inure to the direct and special
benefit of the individual out of whose property a part is taken, he receives
something which none else of the public receive, and it is just that this
should be taken into account in determining what is compensation.
46 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
4" Id. at 326 stated the correlative proposition:
[The just compensation requirement] excludes the taking into account as
an element in the compensation any supposed benefit that the owner may
receive in common with all from the public uses to which his private
property is appropriated, and leaves it to stand as a declaration that no
private property shall be appropriated to public uses unless a full and
exact equivalent for it be returned to the owner.
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Taken as a whole, the statutory scheme has all the earmarks of a
cartel backed and supported by the government. But as is the case
with all government programs, the distribution of benefits among
its members, and to third parties are always hard to pin down given
the multiple political forces at play. Thus McConnell also notes:
But in fact the Raisin Administrative Committee takes
possession of the excess raisins; they are not a pure loss.
The RAC sells them or gives the[m] away at its own
discretion. In 2002-2003 it sold the vast majority of the
reserve raisins, receiving $118,280,587 in revenues, of which
it devoted $53,360,854 to export subsidies. In 2003-2004 the
RAC sold its reserve raisins for $111,242,849, spending
$99,807,957 on export subsidies. 48
The point here is important because it indicates that at least
some of the benefits of the reserve program were diverted from the
farmers to third parties in separate programs. Those dollars
therefore do not count as a return benefit. But so long as the
program was organized by the farmers, it is fair to at least inquire
whether the price increases created by these production limits
supply the growers with the needed return benefits that
compensate for the loss of raisins. To answer this complex question,
the case might have been remanded to sort through the tangle of
price effects to determine what benefits the affected producers
enjoyed. In my view, as developed later, when the use of revenues
from one program to support a second independent program
Theoretically one goal of takings law is to equalize surplus across all individuals, so
as to stabilize government actions. That cannot be done if general social benefits
count against the party whose property is taken when those same benefits are
enjoyed for free by everyone else. See for discussion, EPSTEIN, TAKINGS at 3-6, where
the tale of two pies contemplates pro rata division of surplus. For a fuller discussion,
see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 98-103 (1993).
4 McConnell, supra note 8, at 320.
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redistributes benefits from A to B, that device in general is a taking
that should be struck down absent any strong police power
justification. 49 Those justifications do not exist here.
But in today's world of constitutional make-believe, those
words were never uttered in either the briefs or the opinions. It was
only after the litigation that Professor Michael McConnell, who
argued the case for the Hornes, fessed up to the obvious: the whole
scheme was a cartel.50
In principle, a cartel should expose producers to treble damage
actions if done by their own devices. If the cartel takes revenues,
government sponsorship only makes matters worse, not better. In
principle, the interference with advantageous relationships should
allow some action, either against the government for setting up the
cartel, or against the members for forming it.51 But the proper
claimants are not the producers. Instead, the aggrieved party
should be the consumers who do not purchase directly from the
growers or handlers. Unfortunately, in Block v. Community Nutrition
Institute,52 a milk marketing order case, the Court shut the door on
consumer standing, leaving the only parties hurt by the order
powerless to challenge its validity.5 3 There was no explanation in
4 Horne 1, 135 S. Ct. at 2428.
50 McConnell, supra note 8, at 318 ("In theory, the size of the raisin reserve is set each
year in accordance with expected crop size and market conditions, to maximize the
total income of the raisin industry. In other words, it is a cartel."). For discussion of
the point, see Dean Lueck, The Curious Case of Horne v. Department of Agriculture:
Good Law, Bad Economics?, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 608 (2016).
s' See, e.g., EPSTEIN, TORTS § 21.6 (1999).
52 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
53 Id. at 346. The Court stated:
The remainder of the statutory scheme, however, makes equally clear
Congress' intention to limit the classes entitled to participate in the
development of market orders. The Act contemplates a cooperative
venture among the Secretary, handlers, and producers the principal
purposes of which are to raise the price of agricultural products and to
establish an orderly system for marketing them. Handlers and
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Block why the consumers were treated as having identical interests
with the handlers. It is therefore odd to think that there is some
theory of virtual representation at work in the case, given the likely
conflict of interest between these parties. More specifically, the
consumers who are hurt by artificially increased prices suffer a
harm that is wholly distinct from any harm to members of the
insider groups that designed the policy in the first place. Block
seems wrong on the grounds that as a matter of antitrust law, the
first person outside the inner circle should be able to challenge its
cartel status under the standing rule announced in Illinois Brick v.
Illinois.54 But now standing-for people who have clearly lost-
becomes the source of their complaint.
VI. PHYSICAL V. REGULATORY TAKINGS
Once the Chief Justice ignores the cartel question, Horne II sails
into choppier waters because the Court now has to explain why the
Hornes can prevail, even though they concede that "the
government may prohibit the sale of raisins without effecting a per
se taking."55 At this point, the Chief Justice takes refuge in the worst
feature of the current law by noting that these two different routes
to the same government end arise because "of the settled difference
in our takings jurisprudence between appropriation and
regulation."56
Settled the distinction may be, but it is also incoherent. One of
the basic principles of constitutional law is the anti-circumvention
principle, whereby the government cannot evade its constitutional
responsibilities by changing strategy without changing the
producers - but not consumers - are entitled to participate in the adoption
and retention of market orders.
431 U.S. 720 (1977).
55 Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2428.
56 Id.
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substance or effect of its actions.57 Here, shutting down the growing
of crops surely is an interference with the ordinary use of property.
If one neighbor imposed that restriction on his neighbor, he would
be enjoined from going further and forced to pay damages for past
losses. The state may escape the injunction if the taking is for a
public use, but it cannot escape the duty to compensate, assuming
for a moment that this cartel arrangement -which hurts the public
at large -meets the public use standard. The correct view, therefore,
does not posit some mythical distinction between the expropriation
and the regulation, but treats the two as close substitutes to be
governed by the same position. The current law does this only to
the most limited extent, namely in the case where there is a total
loss of all use of property. This entire structure creates a sharp
discontinuity between that small class of regulations and the
remainder by not once indicating where that boundary line should
be. It is just not sufficient for the Chief Justice to pooh-pooh the
analytical difficulties, or to cite McCulloch v. Maryland58 to the effect
that both means and ends matter. Worse still, he cites the famous
line of Justice Holmes from Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,59 "a strong
public desire to improve the public- condition is not enough to
warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional
way," 60 which cuts the exact opposite way. More specifically, Justice
Holmes is correct insofar as he insists that that the government
cannot avoid compensation for a taking of a partial interest in land
through the regulatory process. Horne presented a genuine
opportunity to review this critical distinction, and the Chief Justice
ran away from the challenge.
57 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN
QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 48-49 (2014).
58 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
59 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
6o Id. at 416.
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Professor McConnell calls the professed unwillingness of the
Chief Justice to get this issue under control as a "quibble." 61
McConnell then tries to salvage the wreckage in Chief Justice
Roberts' opinion by offering a political economy account of the
difference between the outright taking and the regulatory use
restriction that seeks to prop up the distinction:
The constitutional line between takings and use restrictions
reflects the reality that government is more likely to invade
property rights if it thereby gains control over valuable
resources that can be redistributed to its friends.
The distinction also rests on a moral difference - often
deconstructed and disliked by economists -between harm
and benefit. The effect of the distinction is to allow
government to prevent property owners from harming
others, but not to allow government to require property
owners to benefit others. 62
... The government has little incentive to impose use
restrictions whose costs exceed the regulatory benefits
(assuming there is no animus against the property owner).
That is certainly no guarantee of wise or efficient
regulation, but, overall, one would expect the benefits to
exceed the costs, at least roughly.63
Yet this purported ground for distinction ignores the fact that
the government can gain as much control over resources by
regulation as it can by occupation, which is why regulation is an all
too effective substitute for taking. Thus, the typical zoning
ordinance, which prevents one person from developing his land
61 McConnell, supra note 8, at 318.
62 Id. at 320-21.
6 Id. at 319.
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while his neighbor across the street can develop hers, is a transfer of
wealth from one party to the other. The value of the first plot goes
down by the zoning restriction, and the value of the second goes up
because of the legally imposed restriction on competition. This
result will not happen if both parties are subject to the identical
restrictions. Therefore, if the impact is proportionate and the only
parties who vote on the regulation are those who are subject to the
rule, we can expect positive sum games. But if the parties are in
disparate positions, the losers will vote against a proposition,
which, if adopted, will result in a wealth transfer from one group to
another.
McConnell treats this special case as though it is the norm when
he notes that the government has "little incentive" to impose
inefficient regulation, which is only true when the only parties
involved are benefitted equally.64 Just happy outcome happens for
members of the raisin cartel who receive pro rata treatment. But
that proposition is manifestly false in a large number of cases where
the benefits and burdens do not match up. In those cases, the ability
to transfer wealth on a large scale through regulation is in fact easier
than it is through occupation because the government does not
have to conduct a parcel-by-parcel condemnation paid for out of
public revenues. Skewed zoning laws are a lot easier to impose than
outright takings: just think of the furious public response to Kelo. If
anything, therefore, the political risks of misguided regulation are
greater than the parallel risks from occupation. It follows that there
is no reason to tolerate the current distinction, as it only adds on an
extra layer of confusion in trying to maintain the line between them.
Did the government take the air rights in Penn Central, or did it only
forbid the owner of the parcel from using them? It is all irrelevant.
The right question is only to determine the net size of the loss, the
64 Id.
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pro rata treatment applied to the raisin cartel, which is why on
balance the Hornes benefited.
This basic point is orthogonal to the critical distinction between
harms inflicted and benefits conferred, which is essential to keep
the law on an even keel. In this regard, Justice Scalia's unfortunate
speculations in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council65 are the
counsel of intellectual despair. The law of restitution does not allow
me to sue everyone in the world whom I have not killed for
conferring a benefit on them nor does it allow everyone in the
world to sue me because I have not given them money that they
would rather have. 66 Instead, everyone starts from a neutral
baseline in which only a tiny fraction of actions give rise to claims
for either restitution or tort. Hence, actionable benefits are conferred
only by providing property or supplying services to others.
Actionable harms are inflicted only by causing individuals physical
injury or interfering by force or fraud with their potential
advantageous relations. It is the worst kind of constitutional
skepticism to muddy the constitutional waters by doubting a
distinction that has worked well in the private law since it was first
formulated in Roman times. 67
Nor is there any reason to back off on the ground that, as
McConnell puts it, "that erasure of the distinction would be more
likely to water down existing protections for real property than to
expand judicial review of the substance of economic regulation." 68
It is hard to see how that could happen when the compensation
s 505 U.S. 1003, 1023-1025 (1993) ("[T]he distinction between 'harm preventing' and
'benefit-conferring' regulation is often in the eye of the beholder.").
66 For elaboration, see Richard A. Epstein, From Common Law to Environmental
Protection: How the Modern Environmental Movement Has Lost Its Way (2015),
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/epstein-from-common-law.pdf
67 See, e.g., Gaius, Institutes, Bk. III, 91 (discussing restitution); see also, Bk. III, 182 et
seq. (articulating the Roman law of delict).
68 McConnell, supra note 8, at 321.
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awarded under the per se rule in Loretto was wrongly set at $1.00.69
In Loretto, the plaintiff landlord's harm was not the trivial
occupation of her space by Teleprompter, but the legislative
abrogation of her existing contractual right to five percent of
Teleprompter's rentals, which the property owner cannot recoup
from her tenants who now receive exactly the same service at
exactly the same rent after the transfer to Teleprompter.
Nor is there any reason why a similarly disguised transfer of
wealth should be tolerated in other contexts. No zoning scheme, for
example, that provides pro rata net benefits will ever run afoul of
the Takings Clause. Those that do should be attacked as a form of
disguised transfer of property rights meriting serious
countermeasures. The great difficulty today is that all forms of
property protection against the ravages of the political system are
now par for the course. A strong theoretical commitment of the
kind that the McConnell argument abjures could help turn popular
opinion.
VII. RESERVED CONTINGENT INTERESTS
Chief Justice Roberts's opinion takes on a better hue in
addressing the question of whether the reserved contingent interest
in the reserve tonnage excuses the government from the duty to
compensate. Again, the tragic point here is that this question has to
be asked at all. There are two ways to look at this issue, mentioned
above. The first is that the government pays less because it offsets
the expected value of that interest from the total amount owed. Or
second, it pays full value for the property and then gets to keep that
extra interest. In neither case does it matter that the growers do not
get back the dollars tied to their own raisins any more than it
69 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 N.E.2d 428 (N.Y. 1983)
(finding that $1 in compensation was the correct award on remand from the
Supreme Court's determination that a taking had occurred).
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matters that a bank depositor cannot claim the precise bills that he
places in his account. It is quite sufficient that the revenues are
pooled.
What is not acceptable, however, is the proposition that so long
as the property holder has some residual interest in the property
originally taken, the government need not pay for the rest of the
interests that it takes and retains. Yet Justice Sotomayor takes just
that position in her dissent with the astonishing proposition that
"the retention of even one property right that is not destroyed is
sufficient to defeat a claim of a per se taking under Loretto."70 The
effect of her cramped reading of Loretto means that the government
can always avoid the per se compensation rule by announcing that
the owner is entitled to recover the property on the occurrence of
any remote event - for example, the very unlikely event of the
Chicago Cubs winning the World Series three years in a row. That
open invitation to strategic evasion is intolerable in any regime of
limited government.
Indeed, that one maneuver, if accepted, would reduce the law
of physical takings to the same flaccid standards applicable in
regulatory takings cases, a proposition which is equally
counterintuitive. Regulatory takings law asks the question of the
relative deprivation from the original baseline, holding that so long
as a large enough fraction is retained, it does not matter how much
property was taken. That rule would never be applied in any other
context, and it should not be applied to regulations that impose
restrictive covenants over property owners.
The Chief Justice therefore is right to reject this possibility. He is
not right, however, to restrict that insight to physical takings, when
it applies with equal force to all takings. No one can deny the fact
that some taking has been effectuated just because some remnant is
left behind. The government could not take eleven out of twelve
70 Horne I, 133 S. Ct. at 2438 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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apples and then claim that no compensation is owed because one
apple was left behind in the barrel. Why this point has to be
debated at this late date is a mystery. Nor should the Chief Justice
buy into the twisted logic of Andrus v. Allard, 71 which lets the
government strip the owner of the right to sell his property so long
as it leaves him the right to give it away or to continue its present
use. The want of a physical invasion does not undercut the fact that
the resulting loss in value is not caused by random market
fluctuation but through explicit government command. It is as
though the government announced that it took the right to purchase
the eagle feathers for $1, so that compensation is not owed for the
loss.
The point has special force with respect to Yee v. Village -of
Escondido,72 which received only cursory treatment in Home II: "We
held the ordinance did not effect a taking under Loretto, even when
it was considered in conjunction with other state laws regarding
eviction that effectively permitted tenants to remain at will, because
it only regulated the terms of market participation."7 3
The actual situation is in fact far different. By way of
background, Yee rejected a constitutional challenge to Santa
Barbara's local rent control ordinance passed under the authority of
California's Mobile Home Residence Law. The findings in that law
were that it "is necessary that the owners of mobilehomes occupied
within mobilehome parks be provided with the unique protection
from actual or constructive eviction afforded by the provisions of
this chapter."74 Of course, the only people that can be evicted, either
actually or constructively, are the tenants in possession. The statute
thus on its face acknowledges that the mobile home occupants are
- 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
72 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
3 Horne II, 133 S. Ct. at 2441.
74 Id. at 524.
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holdover tenants, who retain possession of their landlord's
property.
Unfortunately, Justice O'Connor refused to acknowledge the
obvious when she denied that the case was one of physical
occupation subject to the per se compensation rule in Loretto. "On
their face, the state and local laws at issue here merely regulate
petitioners' use of their land by regulating the relationship between
landlord and tenant."75 After this quote Justice O'Connor cites the
sentence quoted above from Loretto. But her logic here amounts to
little more than a play on the word "use." The typical land use
restriction determines what uses the admitted owner of the
property activities can undertake with the property over which he
retains possession. In Yee's opportunistic reformulation, the
restriction on use determines who can make use of the property, by
banning the owner from possession and by authorizing the tenant
to remain on the property just like an ordinary lessee in possession.
According to Yee, the permissible challenges in question should be
brought under a regulatory takings framework. It should be no
surprise that the outcome would be a reprise of Penn Central.
Indeed, just that regulatory takings challenge was rejected some
years later in the Ninth Circuit in Guggenheim v. City of Goleta.76 So
long as costs are covered under the public utility model of
regulation put into place, all the appreciation in the value of the
underlying property may be transferred to the tenant, which was in
fact the outcome come once the rent control program was put into
place.
Properly understood, the outcome in Yee is inconsistent with
Horne II given its cavalier treatment of the question of
compensation. Horne II makes it impossible for the government to
deny that there is a taking solely because one stick is left in the
7s Yee, 519 U.S. at 528 (emphasis in original).
76 638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
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bundle of rights. This dubious strategy for calculating just
compensation is now foreclosed, however, by Horne II. Chief Justice
Roberts addresses just this question, stating, "'Whether the
government may avoid the categorical duty to pay just
compensation for a physical taking of property by reserving to the
property owner a contingent interest in a portion of the value of the
property, set at the governments discretion.' The answer is no." 7
In dealing with this question he notes:
The Government and dissent argue that raisins are fungible
goods whose only value is in the revenue from their sale.
According to the Government, the raisin marketing order
leaves that interest with the raisin growers: After selling
reserve raisins and deducting expenses and subsidies for
exporters, the Raisin Committee returns any net proceeds to
the growers. The Government contends that because
growers are entitled to these net proceeds, they retain the
most important property interest in the reserve raisins, so
there is no taking in the first place.78
To which he gives the proper response:
The fact that the growers retain a contingent interest of
indeterminate value does not mean there has been no
physical taking, particularly since the value of the interest
depends on the discretion of the taker, and may be
worthless, as it was for one of the two years at issue here.79
The same analysis applies exactly to the paltry sticks that the
landlord receives under the Santa Barbara ordinance. The retention
of one stick does not negate the taking. Rather the retained sticks
7 Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2428.
78 Id. at 2428-29 (internal citation omitted).
79 Id. at 2429 (emphasis added).
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should go on the other side of the ledger as part of the down
payment on compensation. The amount owed depends on the
combined operation of California's Mobile Home Residency Law
and Santa Barbara's local mobile home rent control ordinances.80
Under the first, the property owner (or "park owner") may
terminate the mobile home owner's tenancy for nonpayment of
rent, for a violation of the law or park rules, or to "change the use of
his land." 81 But he cannot require removal of the mobile home when
that home is sold - at an enormous premium to reflect the
embedded value of the renewal rights - to another private party,
nor can he charge any fee on transfer. The California law does not
restrict the ability of the park owner to set rents, but that option is
removed separately by Proposition K of Santa Barbara that set rents
back to the 1986 level.82 Thereafter, an allowable rental increase
must be approved by the Santa Barbara Council based on a mix of
factors relating to the cost of running the premises, which are
wholly unrelated to its market value.83 In order to make good on the
option to reclaim the property, the landlord must forfeit all interim
rentals on the property during the period when it is idle. Yet, owing
to the multiple hurdles imposed by the zoning process, it is wildly
improbable that the park owner will obtain in timely fashion the
8 Yee, 503 U.S. at 524-25.
8 Id. at 524.
82 Id. at 527.
as Yee, 503 U.S. at 524-25:
The council must approve any increases it determines to be "just, fair and
reasonable," after considering the following nonexclusive list of factors: (1)
changes in the Consumer Price Index; (2) the rent charged for comparable
mobile home pads in Escondido; (3) the length of time since the last rent
increase; (4) the cost of any capital improvements related to the pad or
pads at issue; (5) changes in property taxes; (6) changes in any rent paid by
the park owner for the land; (7) changes in utility charges; (8) changes in
operating and maintenance expenses; (9) the need for repairs other than
for ordinary wear and tear; (10) the amount and quality of services
provided to the affected tenant; and (11) any lawful existing lease.
Ordinance § 4(g), App. 11-12.
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full set of permits, and licenses needed to redevelop the premises in
an economically profitable way. There is no way that the value of
this bundle of rights is "a full and perfect equivalent" for the value
of the right to regain undisturbed possession of the property at the
end of the lease.84 Indeed, as these options have never once been
successfully exercised, their value must be close to zero. The
landlord takes the risk of any downturn in value. The tenant keeps
all the upside above and beyond the few allowable cost increases.
The manifest economic distortions are, if anything, far more
intrusive from the cartel imposition under Yee. The ordinance
draftsman understood perfectly that this miniscule sop to the
landlord could insulate the mobile home scheme from
constitutional scrutiny. Just that ploy worked once in Yee. After
Horne H it should work no longer.
VIII. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
The final point elaborated in Horne deals with the elusive
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Rightly understood, that
doctrine addresses one recurrent question: what conditions may the
government attach to its permits, licenses, and grants, which are
issued in the exercise of its monopoly power?85 Everyone accepts
some version of this doctrine. The government may have the power
to exclude certain classes of driver from the public highways, but it
4 Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 325:
The just compensation clause "prevents the public from loading upon one
individual more than his just share of the burdens of government, and
says that when he surrenders to the public something more and different
from that which is exacted from other members of the public, a full and
just equivalent shall be returned to him."
85 For a complete analysis, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 5
(1993) ("Stated in its canonical form, this doctrine holds that even if the state has
absolute discretion to grant or deny any individual a privilege or benefit, it cannot
grant that privilege subject to conditions that improperly 'coerce,' 'pressure,' or
'induce' the waiver of that person's constitutional rights.").
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cannot grant them admission to the road on the condition that they
waive either their Fourth Amendment protections against
unreasonable searches and seizure, or their First Amendment rights
to the free exercise of religion or freedom of speech. But by the same
token, the government can demand that they waive any right to
refuse to take a breathalyzer test when pulled over for drunk
driving or consent to litigate an accident in the state where it
occurs.
86
In the modern welfare state, the imposition of conditions on
private behavior is a routine matter to which the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine may apply. The problem was set up in Horne I
in this fashion by the following passage from the Eastern District of
California: "In essence, [petitioners] are paying an admissions fee or
toll - admittedly a steep one-for marketing raisins. The
government does not force plaintiffs to grow raisins or to market
the raisins; rather, it directs that if they grow and market raisins,
then passing title to their reserve tonnage raisins to the RAC is the
admissions ticket." 87 This sloppy logic has breathtaking
implications. The government could demand that every person pay
an admission fee or toll to sell any property at any time in any
market, wholly independent of any marketing order. Thus, the
owner who wants to sell his house at market value could be told
that he is allowed to do so only if he turns over half the proceeds to
the state. After all, he does not have to sell the house, but can keep
it. This massive interference with voluntary transactions is
essentially unlimited. The only reason why the interference makes
sense in Horne II is that there is a return benefit to the Hornes from
the restriction in terms of the increased value of the residual crops.
So it is not just a case of having a "voluntary choice." It is the case of
receiving full, in-kind compensation for the property that was
86 Opinion of the Justices, 147 N.E. 681 (Mass. 1925).
87 Horne v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., No. CV-F-08-1549, 2009 WL 4895362, at *26 (E.D. Cal.
Dec. 11, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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taken. But this notion that transactions are voluntary because one
can decline to enter them legitimates every mafia man who says
that you can sell your merchandise so long as you give him 10
percent of the gross. After all, you are always free to go out of
business.
The incoherence of this approach stems from the fact that
sooner or later someone has to decide what fraction of the total gain
must be left to the owner before the transaction is called coercive.
But this question of degree is always out of place. The thief that
says, "Give me $5 dollars or I will shoot you," cannot excuse his
criminal action by noting that he was willing to leave his victim
with $45. The fact of coercion comes from the act of forcing a party
to choose between two things that he has a right to do. The
wrongfulness of coercion lies not in the impermissibility of-the
outcome, but of the forced choice that leads to it. Normally, anyone
has the right to sell or keep property as he or she sees fit. But under
the false-choice regime, the sell side is impaired. What then
happens if the government says, "By the way, we now impose a
storage tax on you if you don't sell your property"? Clearly a
taking, one hopes. The simple point is that the government action
must either be justified in that it prevents some wrong,. or
compensated by some in-kind benefit.
The Chief Justice is right to note that the government cannot
hide behind the proposition that the exaction is just fine because of
the grower's voluntary participation in the market. But it is no
answer to say, "Grow another crop," when that crop too could be
subject to the same marketing restrictions, assuming that it could be
sold for a profit in the first place. The Chief Justice is also right to
note that Loretto prevents that escape valve from the per se rule. He
thus quotes this passage with great effect:
For example, [Teleprompter's position] would allow the
government to require a landlord to devote a substantial
portion of his to vending and washing machines, with all
profits to be retained by the owners of these services and
with no compensation for the deprivation of space. It
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would even allow the government to requisition a certain
number of apartments as permanent government offices.88
After all, the rental property could always be taken off the
market. But as is too often his wont, the Chief Justice is not
prepared to face up to the difficulties in the current law. Thus his
reaction to the harder case presented by Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,
Co., 89 which involved the question of government regulation
involving legitimate purposes of health and safety:
Selling produce in interstate commerce, although certainly
subject to reasonable government regulation, is similarly
not a special governmental benefit that the Government
may hold hostage, to be ransomed by the waiver of
constitutional protection. Raisins are not dangerous
pesticides; they are a healthy snack. A case about
conditioning the sale of hazardous substances on disclosure
of health, safety, and environmental information related to
those hazards is hardly on point. 90
The point is too glib for its own good, for in Monsanto the court
held that even though trade secrets were private property protected
by the Takings Clause, the government could condition their license
on the willingness of Monsanto to share its trade secrets with other
parties, or, at the very least, allow the government to use
information gleaned from Monsanto's operation to evaluate the
application of competitive firms. The "let them eat cake" answer
offered by Justice Blackmun was that Monsanto was free to
abandon the American market and to sell their goods overseas if
they found the conditions too onerous. 91 But clearly that condition
88 Home II, 135 S. Ct. at 2430 (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 439 n.17).
89 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
90 Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2430-31.
91 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1007-08.
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is unconstitutional because the access to foreign markets depends
on what happens in those countries, all of whom could exclude
Monsanto's products if they chose to do so on the same rationale as
used in Monsanto: sell the product somewhere else.
The correct analysis of the situation, therefore, is that the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions only allows the government
to ask for information about matters, which, if they occurred, would
justify either removing the product from the market or requiring its
seller to pay damages under the common-law police power. The
good sense here is that waiting too far down the process could
easily result in irreparable harm. The only question in these cases is
whether the conditions imposed in the ex ante state of the world are
so onerous and irrelevant that they amount to a defacto ban. But the
one thing that the government can never legitimately do is alter the
balance of competition between two rival sellers by giving one the
information that it obtains by force from the other. On this view,
there is no reason at all to subject the reserve raisins to any
inspections above and beyond those already in place for the
marketable raisins, so that this condition is wholly illicit. Once that
point is made clear, then the scope of this doctrine should expand in
other contexts in which there are no police power justifications for
what the state demands. One illustration, that is honored today
more in breach than in performance, is the insistence that landlords
set aside certain units for affordable housing on the ground that a
greater balance of available units is needed in the market place.92
Assume that the end is legitimate, but the means are not. Those
units should be paid for out of general revenues, not particular
charges.93
92 See California Building Industry Ass'n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974 (Cal. 2015).
I critique that case in depth in Richard A. Epstein, The Unassailable Case Against
Affordable Housing Mandates, in EVIDENCE AND INNOVATION IN HOUSING LAW AND
POLICY (Lee Fennell & Benjamin Keys ed.) (forthcoming 2017).
93 Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
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Justice Sotomayor's dissent in Horne II seeks to limit the
potential application of the case by insisting that it only applies to
per se takings, and not to regulatory ones. She writes:
The Court points out that, in a footnote in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., we suggested that it
did not matter for takings purposes whether a property
owner could avoid an intrusion on her property rights by
using her property differently. But in Yee v. Escondido, we
clarified that, where a law does not on its face effect a per se
taking, the voluntariness of a particular use of property or
of entry into a particular market is quite relevant. In other
words, only when a law requires the forfeiture of all rights
in property does it effect a per se taking regardless of
whether the law could be avoided by a different use of the
property.94
But that rear guard action does not work. The first point is that
the purported ground for distinction rests on the dubious claim that
Yee could only be viewed as a regulatory taking, even though the
raison d'etre of the statute was to allow the tenant to remain in
possession after the expiration of the lease-which has to be a
physical taking to which the doctrine applies.95 The second point is
that if, as is the case, there is no coherent line to separate the
physical from the regulatory takings, then it follows that the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has to apply with equal
force in both settings, notwithstanding the dubious effort to limit it
only to physical takings. Recall that the public choice dynamics
behind government regulation works with either equal or, indeed,
greater force in the regulatory takings context, given that the
9 Home II, 135 S. Ct. at 2441 n.3 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted).
- 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
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government regulation can have greater sweep without forcing
local property owners off their own land. 96 In addition, the criticism
of the so-called voluntary surrender of rights is every bit as strong
in the one context as it is in the other. There is no discernible
difference from the state saying that it shall let you increase the size
of your new building from six to twelve stories, but only if you pay
us $100,000 for the permit, than there is from it saying that it will
issue the permit to build from zero to six stories for payment of the
same sum. The total prohibition of new construction is treated as a
per se taking under Lucas v. South Caroline Coastal Council,97 precisely
because there is no difference between that result and the state
requiring a landowner to pay $100,000 to enter his own land,
money which the government then uses to condemn a lateral
easement in front of the property. This second condemnation
scenario runs into the prohibition against unconstitutional
conditions in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.98 No coherent
development is possible unless these jarring discontinuities in the
current law are brought to a merciful end.
IX. TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY FOR TAKINGS,
REGULATIONS AND TAXES
The three opinions in Horne II indicate the very different
approaches that can be taken towards takings law in the context of
the decided cases. But lurking behind this debate is the more
difficult question of just how far the takings analysis extends to
basic matters of regulation and taxation that are not discussed in the
opinion. The implicit norm that drives all nine justices of the
Supreme Court is that the takings portion of the literature can to
96 See e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (utilizing a
multi-factor balance test to determine that a taking had not occurred).
97 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
98 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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some extent be cabined off to deal with individual cases and not
general programs. That line is hard to draw because, although the
Hornes presented only their particular grievance, the position of all
raisin growers was necessarily implicated by the decision. It is
therefore impossible to treat Horne II as a case where one party is
singled out for special treatment. At this point, the question is to ask
whether it is sound for all the justices to shy away from developing
a uniform theory that allows Horne II to be integrated into the
overall body of the law.
This compartmentalized approach has a long constitutional
heritage, and indeed the central feature of modern law is an
insistence that it is possible to break takings, taxation, and
regulation into three watertight categories, each governed by its
own set of rules.99 Under this approach, for example, there is no
overlap between taxation and takings, so that the latter are not
covered by the former. The Takings Clause only applies to cases
where individual firms are singled out for special treatment, but not
the case where an industry receives that kind of treatment. One
historical illustration that supports this position is the Whisky Tax
of January 27, 1791, an excise tax on domestic and imported alcohol
which was aimed at reducing the national debt recently taken over
from the states. 100 The tax proved hugely unpopular and generated
a whisky rebellion among western farmers that collapsed only only
after a heavy show of force. The logic behind this tax was two-
9 Needless to say I have attacked this separation in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 95 (1985): "All regulations,
all taxes, and all modifications of liability rules are takings of private property prima
facie compensable by the state." Note that I add in liability to cover such cases as
statutes of limitation, of workers' compensation, and retroactive imposition of
liability. Id. at 242-59. Note, too, the use of the words prima facie, which invite both
affirmative police power justifications and the recognition of implicit-in-kind
compensation through general regulation. Id. at Chs. 9-11, 14. These are not meant to
be narrow exceptions, but extensive elements of a comprehensive system.
100 Saul Cornell, Mobs, Militias, and Magistrates: Popular Constitutionalism and the
Whiskey Rebellion, 81 CHI. KENT L. REv. 883, 894 (2006).
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fold.101 On the one hand, it was a clever way to raise revenue, and
on the other it was defended as a means to regulate the
consumption of alcohol. 102 The first of these is an economic
justification. The second comes much closer to the moral head of the
police power, where the tax would surely be justified if the
government would have been justified in banning alcohol outright
under the same circumstances.
It is worth noting that as of the date of its passage, the Whiskey
Tax posed no special constitutional problem. Article I, Section 8,
Clause 1 gave explicit authorization for the use of excise taxes to
pay of the debts of the United States, which is exactly what this tax
did. 103 In essence, the original design put very substantial
limitations on the purposes for which tax revenues of all kinds could
be expended, but placed no limitation on the sources for any
individual tax. It is clear that the internal limitations on the power
to tax contained in Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 were largely
eliminated by the time of the New Deal and remain moribund
today.1 04
101 See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First
Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 784-87 (1994).
102 Id.
103 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common
defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States."
104 See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted) ("Congress has broad authority to construct
or adjust spending programs to meet its contemporary understanding of the general
Welfare. Courts owe a large measure of respect to Congress' characterization of the
grant programs it establishes."). On the other side, the per curiam conservative
opinion took the same basic position: "The power to make any expenditure that
furthers the general welfare is obviously very broad, and shortly after Butler was
decided the Court gave Congress wide leeway to decide whether an expenditure
qualifies." Id. at 2658. Both these statements are accurate reflections of the current
law. But both are subject to serious textual and structural objections. See, for
discussion, EPSTEIN, supra note 57, at 193-203.
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For these purposes, however, the key question is not the
internal limits on the taxation power found in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 1. Rather, it is the extent to which this power of taxation was
restricted by the passage of the Bill of Rights, which applies to all
exercises of power by the government, including those done
pursuant to the taxing power. For example, there is no doubt that
the basic prohibition of the First Amendment has been read to
impose serious limitations on the power of the federal government
and, after incorporation, the states to levy taxes. Thus in line with
the general principles of classical liberalism, Minnesota Star &
Tribune v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue 105 held that the
government could not single out newspapers for special taxes.
Justice O'Connor correctly insisted that Minnesota could reach any
revenue target through a flat tax that had none of the dangers posed
by selective taxation on the press. 106 Minnesota Star also rejected
distinctions within the class of newspapers that exempted smaller
newspapers from the taxes imposed on larger ones, again out of the
fear of factional abuse.107 First Amendment protection is not limited
to firms singled out for special treatment. But it is equally clear that
a general sales tax that covers many other businesses will survive
any constitutional scrutiny because the broad scope helps
105 460 U.S. 575 (1985).
106 Id. at 586:
Standing alone, however, [the state interest in raising revenue] cannot
justify the special treatment of the press, for an alternative means of
achieving the same interest without raising concerns under the First
Amendment is clearly available: the State could raise the revenue by
taxing businesses generally, avoiding the censorial threat implicit in a tax
that singles out the press.
107 Id. at 592 (" [Wle think that recognizing a power in the State not only to single out
the press but also to tailor the tax so that it singles out a few members of the press
presents such a potential for abuse that no interest suggested by Minnesota can
justify the scheme."). For applications, see Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,
481 U.S. 221, 223 (1987) (striking down, on First Amendment grounds, a "state sales
tax scheme that taxes general interest magazines, but exempts newspapers and
religious, professional, trade,,and sports journals...").
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counteract the risks of abuse. Even with the inevitable complexities
in marginal cases, this same speech regime could be applied to
takings more generally. That approach would, for instance, strike
down the Affordable Care Act's excise tax specifically targeted at
medical devices that helps fund expenditures under the Affordable
Care Act.108 This tax has proved so disruptive that it was subject to a
two-year moratorium between January 1, 2016 and December 31
2017,109 after which there will be more ad hoc developments.
Of course the modern view does not endorse that unified
approach, but insists that the only abuse worth worrying about is
the "singling out" of a given firm or person for special treatment.
Saul Levmore takes that position when he writes:
I have suggested elsewhere that when the government
threatens to intervene in a way that will burden many
citizens, these citizens need to look to the political process
rather than to takings law for any relief, but that when the
government singles out a private party, in the sense that the
government's aims could have been achieved in many ways
but the means chosen placed losses on an individual or on
persons who are not part of an existing or easily organized
political coalition, then we can expect to find a compensable
taking.110 Thus, most taxes and rent control schemes are not
compensable takings because they are the products of
political exchanges; taxpayers and landlords are left to
108 I.R.C. § 4191, enacted by section 1405 of the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010), in conjunction
with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010) (jointly, the ACA).
109 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-113 (2016).
10 The canonical citation for this proposition is Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,
49 (1960): The Fifth Amendments guarantee that private property shall not be taken
for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.
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protect themselves in the political arena. In contrast,
individuals who are subjected to "spot zoning" are often
politically unprotected, because they are burdened in a way
that makes it unlikely that they can find political allies, and
takings law will often protect them from majoritarian
exploitation."'
There is little difference between myself and Levmore on the
singling out cases where compensation is awarded in theory. The
isolation of one person to bear the burden imposed by diffuse gains
is reason enough to conclude that an implicit transfer has taken
place. But Levmore and I arrive at this conclusion on quite different
grounds. The first point is that Levmore is indifferent to finding any
textual warrant for his approach. He does not go through the task of
identifying the property interest taken by government intervention,
the limitations imposed by the public use requirement - which
should be substantial when property ends up in private hands -or
matters of just compensation and the police power. His sole
emphasis is on the ex ante political vulnerability of the target.
My approach differs on both counts. Textually, rent control is a
transfer of a term interest in property to the tenant at a price below
its fair market value, without any public use or police power
justification. In making the judgment on the taking, I think that it is
immaterial whether one or another group had the wherewithal to
defend itself through the political process. The question is whether
it should be put to that cost, with the consequent uncertainty and
dislocation that this factional struggle generates. To avoid that
inquiry, I look exclusively to the ex post wealth transfer achieved by
the government action.
I Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333,
1344-45 (1991). Levmore's earlier work on this issue can be found in Saul Levmore,
Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 305-319 (1990).
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What is true about rent control is true about all other issues of
land use regulation. Thus his equivocation on "spot zoning" cases
rests on the view that sometimes, but not always, these players are
political isolated. But in practice, it is very difficult to know how
that plays out. For example, in Penn Central, Justice Rehnquist made
much of the spot-zoning ordinance at the level of administration, 112
which Justice Brennan rejected because the entire scheme had city
wide application. 113 Yet if we know that the imposition of the
landmark preservation ordinance provided an uncompensated
takings of air rights, why go through the political rigmarole to
determine just how the political alliances were stacked?
The point becomes still more troublesome with respect to rent
control and taxation, even when the groups selected out are stroitg
enough to put up a fight within the political process. But other
considerations indicate that the class conflicts are often more
dangerous than the individual ones because they unleash the larger
and more dangerous power of political coalitions. The battles over a
rent control ordinance thus pit all landlords subject to the ordinance
against all sitting tenants, who would abandon the price control
112 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 139-40:
Only in the most superficial sense of the word can this case be said to
involve "zoning." Typical zoning restrictions may, it is true, so limit the
prospective uses of a piece of property as to diminish the value of that
property in the abstract because it may not be used for the forbidden
purposes. But any such abstract decrease in value will more than likely be
at least partially offset by an increase in value which flows from similar
restrictions as to use on neighboring properties.
Note that in this case, the reciprocal benefit is presumed, not proved, and there is not
even a claim that it is equal to the value lost. Therefore, this benefit is clearly less
than the required amount of implicit in-kind compensation.
113 Id. at 132:
In contrast to discriminatory zoning, which is the antithesis of land-use
control as part of some comprehensive plan, the New York City law
embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic or
aesthetic interest wherever they might be found in the city, and as noted,
over 400 landmarks and 31 historic districts have been designated
pursuant to this plan.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty
773
New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 10:734
piece of the statute in an instant were it not for the decisive fact that
the benefits all accrue to sitting tenants, even if they impose heavy
costs on new tenants coming into the community, assuming that
they can find accommodations in this highly restricted market. But
if the Takings Clause is concerned about transfers from A to B, it
should be more concerned about similar transfers from a large class
of A's to a large class of B's, when there is little or no overlap
between the groups. This is one reason why Yee and similar cases
are so dangerous; the element of reciprocity that drives implicit in-
kind compensation is just not present.
Levmore rightly notes that the same framework that applies to
rent control also applies to taxes, even as he concludes that it
applies to "most" such taxes without giving a test for which taxes
fall outside the ambit of the rules. There are three reasons to think
that political action is not a sufficient remedy. First, often the wrong
side wins and often for all the wrong reasons. It is easy for political
deliberation to rally the supporters of rent control and special taxes
that benefit the electorate at large. They are insiders who vote in
large numbers. Landlords, even if local, are surely outnumbered.
Second, even if the right side wins, the entire process is larded with
uncertainty about the outcome in the particular case and the
anticipated influence that it will have on future cases. Uncertainty is
a cost, and it is one that never disappears because even after the ore
issue is resolved, a second, third, and then a fourth issue inevitably
arise. Third, there are public and private administrative costs to
deciding these battles. Once the system is put into place, there are
further ongoing administrative costs to administer it in a climate
where the losers think the rules are illegitimate because of the way
that they were imposed by self-interested majorities. Hence the
battles tended to be pitched and bitter. Politics is a curse, not a
remedy.
At this point we should thus reserve the political remedy for
cases in which the competitive market does not provide a real
alternative, such as in the case of standard public goods that are by
nature available to all. To be sure, politics offers relatively few easy
cases where all persons are benefited and are burdened, much less
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in exactly the same proportions. Even streetlights may not provide
equal benefits to all persons. But the notion that public (i.e.
indivisible) goods are always uniform in value is exploded by every
political struggle over whether to recognize a foreign nation, wage
war, supply defense, or build infrastructure. These decisions, by
their very nature, affect all citizens. Individual solutions, therefore,
are just not possible. In these cases, one relies on deliberation
because there is no way people can go their separate ways. It is this
distinction that marks the area in which judicial protection of
property rights becomes impossible. But the normative side of
standard public choice theory thus reinforces the view of strong
judicial intervention in evident cases of political failure whether we
are dealing with the individual case or a single line of business. The
same set of concerns is apparent in any effort to draw a sharp line
between possessory and regulatory takings. After all Penn Central
itself is best understood as a taking of a property interest in air
rights that is fully protected under state law.
The effort to create a trichotomy fails because of the inability for
anyone to draw boundaries between takings, taxes, and regulations,
or to explain why the dangers of faction are limited only to a small
class of physical occupations caught by the current narrow reading
of the Loretto rule. Notwithstanding the well-acknowledged
doctrinal malaise and its negative social consequences, all Supreme
Court justices on both sides of the political divide write as though
there is some deep internal logic that justifies keeping the categories
alive. It is depressing that the Chief Justice does not articulate the
clear implications that follow from his decision on such critical
issues as the precarious status of the regulatory takings law and the
latent incoherence in the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
Sadder still is Justice Sotomayor's claim that so long as a single stick
remains in the bundle of property rights, it is as if nothing has been
taken at all. The one bright point in the case is the candid
acknowledgment of Justice Breyer that the return benefit from the
cartel undercuts the claim that the physical taking in Horne was
wholly uncompensated. But here too, Justice Breyer was not
prepared to pull the switch and take on the implications of his logic
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in cases like Yee and the full range of unconstitutional conditions
cases.
CONCLUSION
By now it should be clear that most of the artificial distinctions
and unsatisfactory twists and turns in Horne come from its failure
to embrace a systematic approach to the general takings question.
So the real institutional mystery here is this: why the deep reliance
on half measures that don't work? Part of the reason comes from
the inveterate habit of Supreme Court justices to take some
minimalist strategy as if they could break off one part of a larger
whole. But that solution results in a makeshift body of doctrine that
no one in the end defends. There is, I fear, a deeper reason that cuts
in the opposite direction. My sense is that the justices are well
aware of the radical consequences that would flow from the explicit
adoption of a the full-fledged takings theory of the sort that I
adopted in my Takings book, where I made the modest claim that,
on strict interpretivist grounds, the New Deal is unconstitutional
under the Takings Clause.1 1 4 Nothing from the intellectual twists
and turns of the past 31 years have led me to revise that judgment.
It is not that all the decisions have come out the wrong way.
Clearly, Horne II reached the right result. But it is precisely the eager
avoidance of any clear theory that leaves everything up in the air.
There is indeed much unfinished business after Horne.
"4 See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 281-282 (concluding most of the New Deal is
unconstitutional under a proper reading of the Takings Clause).
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